Le 22 juillet à 11h, le Grenoble institut des Neurosciences a invité Kenneth Williford (université du Texas, Arlington) pour un séminaire intitulé «  Neurophenomenology and the Neural Correlates of Consciousness ».

The neurophenomenological program, if successful, would provide us with a conceptually clear bridge from first-person conscious experience to a neuroscientific theory of consciousness. A crucial assumption of the program is that such experience can provide us with genuine knowledge of the explanatorily relevant properties of consciousness. In this talk, I consider arguments for and against that assumption and consider possible criteria of explanatory relevance as well. I end by briefly discussing four examples from the neurophenomenological point of view: Damasio’s theory of consciousness, Tononi’s theory of consciousness, Friston’s “Bayesian Brain” paradigm, and Rudrauf’s projective geometrical model of first-person conscious experience.

Lieu :
Grenoble Institut des Neurosciences
Amphi Serge Kampf